We estimate and test a model of voluntary disclosure in which a manager's information set is uncertain (Dye 1985; Jung and Kwon 1988) . In this model, a manager makes his disclosure decision to maximize the market price, but sometimes, for exogenous reasons, he cannot or is not willing to disclose. We offer a flexible framework to measure the prevalence of unobservable disclosure frictions and the quality of managers' private information. More broadly, the method can be used to test for voluntary disclosure in datasets featuring an option to withhold. We also develop theory-based tests for detecting whether a firm is reporting strategically. At the firm level, we reject strategic reporting for between 1/3 to 2/3 of the sample of firms. Finally, estimating the model with quarterly management guidance, we document that firms face a disclosure friction between 30% to 46% of the time. Conditional on not facing a friction, firms strategically withhold between 4.3% to 20.7% of the time. To aid policymakers, these estimates predict that the level of voluntary forecasts will increase by 2.6% to 13.5% in a counter-factual world without strategic information withholding.
Introduction
Disclosure theory postulates that managers will reveal some of their private information if they (i) may truthfully disclose information, (ii) choose to do so if it increases the market price, but (iii) are subject to a disclosure friction that may prevent costless communication. The theory helps explain why information flows into the capital market even before regulated accounting numbers are released (Ball and Brown 1968) , why voluntary disclosures account for a large portion of returns (Beyer, Cohen, Lys and Walther, 2010) and provides a theoretical foundation for the role of mandatory disclosure rules (Coffee 1984; Porta, Lopez-de Silanes and Shleifer 2006) .
Despite its wide appeal, the theory faces continued open challenges to its defining assumption, namely, that observed disclosures are truly voluntary as predicted by the theory or reflect legal obligations to report both good and bad news. For example, to give two well-known empirical facts, Lev and Penman (1990) find that markets respond negatively to withholding of earnings forecasts and Lang and Lundholm (2000) document that managers release more positive voluntary disclosures prior to new capital issues. On the other hand, other studies report that most disclosure are related to litigation concerns that might specifically target firms that report strategically (Skinner 1994; Francis, Philbrick and Schipper 1994) .
1
One problem when trying to test disclosure theory is that it is extremely capable to rationalize many features of the data. A disclosure friction is hard to observe empirically, so a direct test of the theory is difficult. In models with uncertainty about a reporting friction (Dye 1985; Jung and Kwon 1988) , the friction must be assumed to be unobservable to outsiders to prevent unraveling, thus a test that relies on a contemporaneous proxy for the friction is incompatible with the theory.
2 Indirect evidence about the theory is 1 We have only picked here two examples of an extensive empirical literature; see Beyer, Cohen, Lys and Walther (2010) for a review of this literature.
2 Other voluntary disclosure theories share the same challenges. In the costly disclosure model of Verrecchia (1983) , the link between competitive disclosure costs and observable characteristics of an industry is ambiguous (Wagenhofer 1990; Darrough 1993; Corona and Nan 2013; Cheynel and Ziv 2015) . elusive as well. If the frequency of disclosure frictions is low, the unraveling theorem of Milgrom (1981) predicts that both good and bad news will be voluntarily disclosed and can rationalize high levels of disclosure that occasionally feature bad news. Alternatively, if frictions occur with high frequency, the theory can rationalize low levels of disclosure, so that the frequency of disclosure, on its own, provides limited evidence about the theory.
In this paper, we develop an alternative structural approach to estimating and testing the basic voluntary disclosure model from Dye (1985) and Jung and Kwon (1988) . Such an approach carries benefits and costs. On the benefit side, the approach allows us to recover the decision problem solved by the managers and quantify the magnitude of the disclosure friction, which by nature is unobserved and hence impossible to quantify in a model free approach. We design an estimation procedure that relies on an unexploited implication of disclosure theory: the frequency of disclosure and the type of news disclosed should be connected: a situation in which bad news are disclosed should be symptomatic of (near-) unraveling, implying that frictions are low and disclosure frequency is high. Together, our estimation approach recovers, at the firm level, the probability of a disclosure friction (between 30% to 46%), as well as the fraction of non-disclosures due to strategic motives (4.3% to 20.7%). These estimates, while themselves interesting, also enable us to perform counter-factual analysis of the potential impact of policies designed to reduce the incidence of strategic information disclosure.
3 In particular, our estimates suggest that the level of voluntary forecast will increase by 4.3% to 13.5% in a counter-factual world without strategic information disclosure and economically significant relative to the median firm's disclosure frequency of 48%.
On the cost side, the analysis requires some auxiliary assumptions that need not be satisfied by all models in disclosure theory. We estimate only classes of models with uncertainty about a disclosure friction: these are models in which the manager sometimes 3 The only comparative exercise we are aware of that quantifies the effect of policy interventions on information withholding is Jin, Luca and Martin (2015) which looks at how educational interventions to receivers about senders' strategies change the amount of unraveling in equilibrium.
does not disclose for exogenous reasons -as in Dye (1985) and Jung and Kwon (1988) , hereafter, DJK. Nevertheless, we also develop two generalizations of this model, which involve 1) an exogenous probability of disclosure and 2) serially-correlated information endowment (Einhorn and Ziv 2008) . A second notable cost is that the relationships predicted by the theory are non-linear and, therefore, one cannot estimate the econometric model by ordinary least-squares. To minimize complexity, we derive a simple closed-form estimator of the friction and remain as close as possible to classic theoretical models.
Further, the methods used here are commonly-used and not intended as an econometric contribution. Our hope is to remove any barriers to entry to using these methods in empirical accounting research by offering a detailed step-by-step account of their implementation.
For our empirical application, we use quarterly management forecasts from US firms.
Having noted this, however, any voluntary disclosure setting for which we observe either quantitative disclosure or market reactions is suitable for the method. We propose two estimation methods that present different perspectives on the problem. First, we estimate the model with the generalized method of moments (GMM) using for the estimation several interpretable moments predicted by the theory. GMM is a robust and relatively simple method, that delivers both estimates and a test statistic, the J test, which measures the distance between the theoretical moments and the data. Second, we estimate the model using maximum likelihood estimation (MLE); MLE can be interpreted as a special case of moment estimation involving the set of moments corresponding to first-order condition of the likelihood function. Asymptotically, MLE is the most efficient estimator but, typically, at the cost of greater sensitivity to distributional assumptions.
In terms of ease of use, both GMM and MLE are very standard techniques and, as we illustrate, one or the other can be simpler to implement depending on the desired assumptions. Our GMM procedure is sufficiently robust to be used with pooled samples (one set of parameters imposed on multiple firms) despite high levels of heterogeneity.
By contrast, our MLE procedure assumes a time-varying friction to capture stickiness in forecasts. If frictions are sufficiently persistent, after a disclosure, the probability of a disclosure friction in the next period is low and therefore the managers will be more likely to disclose again. Further, given unfavorable realized earnings, the market will update that the managers was (most likely) not subject to the friction, thus predicting more disclosure in the next period.
Related literature. Our approach is closely related to a number of recent studies, which focus on the estimation of biases in reported earnings. Beyer, Guttman and Marinovic (2014) estimate a dynamic misreporting model. In their model, the manager can bias a mandatory report for a cost but the market cannot recover the true signal because of noise in the accounting system (Fischer and Verrecchia, 2000; Dye and Sridhar, 2004 ). Both Zakolyukina (2014) and Terry (2014) estimate structural models where agents consider the dynamic consequences of manipulation. Zakolyukina (2014) estimates her model using observed accounting violations, recovering current choice of manipulation as a trade-off between current benefits and an increase in the long-term probability of an accounting restatement. Terry (2014) focuses on the effect of misreporting on firm's dynamic investment policy, measuring that reporting incentives appear to cause significant distortions to investment.
Two recent studies have examined properties of voluntary disclosure within a structural model. Cheynel and Liu-Watts (2015) and Bertomeu, Beyer and Taylor (2015) estimate the implied disclosure cost in the classic Verrecchia (1983) . Their primary focus, however, is not on the Dye-Jung-Kwon but it is possible that, as part of future efforts, more general models may involve estimating and separating both types of friction.
Lastly, several studies focus on a structural model of reversals, that is over-reporting of earnings must reverse when cash flows occur, to identify misreporting.
Two examples in this strand are Gerakos and Kovrijnykh (2013) and Nikolaev (2014) .
The first paper shows that biases in reported earnings map into a second-order auto-correlation in accruals. As we do, they apply their methodology to the cross-section of firms to test for strategic manipulation. The second paper estimates a structural model of reversals from its moment conditions to recover the link between manipulation and observed reversals. In this prior literature, discretion takes the form of a bias to earnings. By contrast, our study focuses on disclosures that are entirely voluntary. To our knowledge, the only study that implements a test of an earnings forecast model is Chen and Jiang (2006) ; however, they focus on how analysts weight information when making forecasts.
There is also an extensive theoretical literature on voluntary disclosure drawing on the original model of Dye (1985) .
4 One prediction in the case of multi-dimensional disclosures is the use of sanitation strategies, in which all unfavorable information is withheld (Shin 1994 (Shin , 2003 ; we did not examine such types of disclosures here for two reasons: first, we cannot easily identify a multi-dimensional distribution of private signals and, second, disclosures that take the form of a lower bound, as predicted by sanitation, are very rare.
Other studies predict that disclosure can interact with other features of the environment.
For example, in Indjejikian (1991) , Huddart, Hughes and Brunnermeier (1999) , Bertomeu, Beyer and Dye (2011) , the amount of information released is a function of the price discovery in the market. Dye and Sridhar (1995) and Acharya, Demarzo and Kremer (2011) show that, given correlation between firms' information, firms' disclosure can be positively correlated to other firms' disclosures. These extensions offer possible future steps for the methods developed here.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We describe in Section 2 the modeling framework and estimation strategy. Section 3 reports the data and our main GMM estimation results. Section 4 describes extensions to the basic framework and 4 There is also a large literature providing empirical evidence about management forecasts. This approach can be much more comprehensive as to the factors that relate to forecasts, such as crosssectional differences in litigation risk (Brown, Hillegeist and Lo, 2005) or shocks to stock prices (Sletten, 2012) . By contrast, our purpose here is to identify and measure one possible first-order, unobservable, economic primitive of forecasts.
estimation results from MLE. Finally Section 5 concludes.
The empirical model

Method of moments
We follow the setting and notation of Dye (1985) and Jung and Kwon (1988) , hereafter DJK. For expositional purposes, we describe the analysis in the context of a single firm making earnings forecasts, referring to a disclosure as a forecast and the realized number as earnings. In this section, we derive theoretical moments, that is, restrictions on the data implied by DJK that will allow us to estimate and test the model.
In each period t = 1, . . . , T , the manager has an expectation x t about end-of-period earnings. There is a probability p 0 ∈ (0, 1) that the manager faces a disclosure friction.
When facing the friction, the manager cannot or does not wish to disclose. For example, in the original formulation of Dye (1985) , this is motivated by assuming that the manager does not receive information and cannot disclose that he is uninformed. However, other motivations yield the same equation: for example, when subject to the friction, the manager may not care about the short-term stock price or, alternatively, may face prohibitive disclosure costs.
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With probability 1 − p 0 , the manager is not subject to the friction and may either truthfully disclose a forecast (d t = 1) or withhold that information (d t = 0). Forecasts are netted out of the market expectation (i.e., they are defined as forecast surprises) and we assume that x t /σ follows a standard normal distribution with p.d.f φ(.) and c.d.f. Φ(.) with σ > 0. In the absence of the friction, the manager discloses strategically to maximize the post-disclosure market price, which we assume is linear in the market 5 For example, Edmans, Goncalves-Pinto, Wang and Xu (2014) show that, in months in which the CEO has vesting equity, he releases more news. This attracts attention to the stock increasing trading volume, which allows the CEO to cash out his equity in a more liquid market. Indeed, they find that these news releases lead to significant increases in the stock price and trading volume in a 16-day window, but the effect dies down over 31 days, consistent with a temporary attention boost.
expectation about x t .
6
In the unique equilibrium of this game, managers with x t ≥ y 0 disclose, where a manager observing y 0 is indifferent between disclosing and not disclosing. From Equation (7) in Jung and Kwon (1988) , specialized to normal distributions, the threshold satisfies
and we can define z 0 = y 0 /σ is the standardized threshold. Equation (19) defines an implicit relation z 0 = Z(p 0 ) that maps the probability of any friction to a standardized disclosure threshold. The function Z(.) is increasing, because a higher probability of the friction p makes it more likely that the firm was subject to the friction and did not strategically withhold. This increases the non-disclosure price causing more firms to withhold information.
Equation (19) is not yet in a form suitable for empirical analysis, because we observe
T t=1 but do not directly observe the true parameters (p 0 , σ).
However, noting that the model implies that d t = 1 xt≥y 0 , we can formally derive several moment restrictions.
First, the expected probability of a disclosure predicted by the model is E(d t ) which, since d t = 1 if and only if (a) the manager is not subject to the friction, which has probability p 0 , and (b) x t is greater than y, which has probability Φ(−Z(p 0 )), implies
The left-hand of this moment can be estimated using the sample frequency of a forecast 6 The theory can be (fairly easily) extended to risk-averse investors, but we feel uncomfortable using risk-aversion to fit the model. First, voluntary disclosures contain, for the most part, firm-specific risks that might be diversified away, in which case the systematic component will not affect the disclosure threshold (Cheynel 2012) . Second, in a setting with constant absolute risk-aversion, the risk-aversion of the representative investor declines fast in the number N of potential investors (at rate 1/N , see, e.g., Dye 2010); hence, empirically, it is unlikely that risk-aversion would change the results unless we appealed to extremely high levels of individual risk-aversion. Note, finally, that the predictions of DJK do not depend on whether the manager is risk-averse.
d and yields an implied estimated value for p 0 . Of course, the greater the observed frequency, the lower the probability of the friction.
Second, we examine the prediction of the model for E(d t x t ), which is intended to extract information from both forecast frequency and the expected forecast.
7 Note that
The left-hand side of this equation can be estimated by the sample averagedx over all observed forecasts and zeros for periods without a forecast. If, say, we observe a large average sample forecast, the moment condition requires that either (a) the probability of the friction is high, so that only managers with very good news would optimally disclose, or that (b) the volatility of the private information is large, which reduces the level of the expectation relative to the ex-ante variance.
After substituting the sample moments, equations (8)-(9) form a system of two equations in two unknowns. The method of moments estimator (p,σ) of the parameters (p 0 , σ)
is defined as the solution to the system of equations
A valid solution (with positiveσ) requires the sample average forecasts to be positive, ordx ≥ 0. It can be verified that this equation has, at most, a unique solution, implying that the parameters of interest are parametrically identified.
7 Throughout, we remain as close as possible to the generalized method of moments (GMM) in Hansen (1982) which (in its standard form) requires the same number of observations for each moment. This implies that we cannot use the conditional expectation of forecasts E(x t |d t = 1) since, unlike the frequency moment, it is calculated using fewer observations. However, loosely speaking, the unconditional moment E(d t x t ) should contain at least as much information as E(x t |d t = 1) in order to identify p and σ.
One complication in (4) is that finding a solution requires solving a non-linear equation. However, the solution can be very closely approximated as a closed-form expression of the sample moments that can be plugged in any statistical package. Settinĝ p a = 0.9d 2 − 1.9d + 1 and (5)
the maximum approximation error |p a −p| and |dx/σ a −dx/σ| remains below .01 for all p ∈ [0, 1], which implies that we can use these approximations as very good substitutes for the correct estimator (p,σ). Equation (5)- (6) also imply an approximation for the standard-error ofp given by 1.85(1 −d)
From equation (4), we can also estimate and approximate the probability of strategic
In equation (7), if the friction is very small, unraveling to full disclosure predicts that nearly all information is reported; vice-versa, if the friction is very large, no manager will be reporting strategically. The maximum level of strategic reporting is attained for intermediate values of the friction. 9 This observation has an important consequence:
because strategic withholding is not a monotonic function of the disclosure frequency, one 8 To prove this, note that, from the central limit theorem,
2 − 1.9x + 1 which, applying the delta method, yields
.
9 It is uncertainty about the friction, not its level, that determines strategic withholding. This feature of strategic models is relatively transparent in the original DJK, yet lost to empirical studies that use frequency of disclosure as a proxy for discretionary disclosure. Note that the same aspect is also true in models of noise trading, where the maximum level of information asymmetry is attained when there is maximal uncertainty about the noise trade (Bertomeu, Beyer and Dye 2011). cannot use disclosure frequency as a proxy for the unconditional probability of strategic disclosure.
Generalized method of moments
The method of moment estimator in equation (4) uses two moment conditions to estimate two parameters and, typically, will find parameter values that perfectly fit all the moments. The generalized method of moments (GMM) is an extension of this method, which may involve more moment restrictions than parameters. The over-identifying restrictions can be used to incorporate more predictions of the model; further, GMM admits a test statistic, the J test, that can be used to test whether the over-identifying restrictions are satisfied by the data.
To develop multiple over-identifying restrictions, we use information from realized earnings e t where, to lighten notation, we write e t in earnings surprise with unconditional mean zero. Assume that (x t ,ẽ t ) ∼ N ((µ 0 , 0) , V 0 ) are jointly normally distributed with positive definite variance V 0 and such that the manager's expectation may involve a bias µ 0 .
10 The two moments in equations (8) and (9) can be written E(g 1,t ) = 0 and E(g 2,t ) = 0, where
Next, we incorporate an additional moment meant the capture the variability of observed forecasts. Trying to explain this variability is important given that the method-ofmoment estimator defined earlier may generate a variance σ that seemingly contradicts 10 We allow for the possibility that management forecasts are biased relative to earnings (Fischer and Verrecchia 2000; Stocken and Verrecchia 2004; Indjejikian and Matějka 2009; Caskey, Nagar and Petacchi 2010) . We define bias in forecasts as b f ≡ E t [x t ] − µ t and bias in earnings as b e ≡ E t [e t+1 ] − µ t . In essence, these biases are firm fixed-effects, and they might account for the possibility that managers manipulate the forecast strategically, given the unverifiable nature of management forecasts (Rogers and Stocken 2005) , or that managers exhibit behavioral biases. the observed dispersion of forecasts. Specifically, we use the theoretical prediction
is greater when forecasts vary more (σ is high) or when forecasts are observed less often (p is high). This equation can be rewritten as the moment E(g 3,t ) = 0 where
Lastly, we use the implied forecast error by the model, using the implication E(d t (x t − e t − µ)) = 0. This yields the moment restriction E(g 4,t ) = 0 where
For each observation, we define the stacked moment vector g t = (g 1,t g 2,t g 3,t g 4,t ) .
The generalized method of moment involves obtaining an estimatorθ = (p,σ,μ) for the true parameters θ 0 = (p 0 , σ 0 , µ 0 ) obtained by minimizing the following objective function
where W can be any invertible weighting matrix.
Hansen (1982) shows that the most efficient estimation can be achieved by choosing W to be a consistent estimator of Ω −1 , where Ω = V ar(g t ), the variance of the moments.
The logic of this procedure is similar to generalized least-squares and sets a lower weight on moments that are more noisy. To implement the estimation, we run the estimation with W equal to the identity matrix, recover (inefficient but consistent) estimates of the parameters and use this first-stage estimation to compute W −1 = 1/T g t g t as the sample variance matrix (which is a consistent estimator of Ω). Then, we compute efficient estimates using this new weighting matrix in equation (12). The J-test statistic, defined as T × Obj, follows, asymptotically, a chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the difference between the number of moments (4) and the number of parameters (3).
3 Empirical application
Data description
While the method is applicable to any voluntary disclosure, management forecasts are a natural setting where one might look for evidence of the theory. First, Dye (1985) built the original theory with explicit reference to management forecasts, noting that such forecasts are made before actual earnings are fully realized and reflect private information held by management. Second, managers may face shareholder lawsuits or penalties within a short horizon, especially if the realized earnings number is very different from the forecast.
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Third, managers decide whether to issue a forecast and the data features observable periods with or without forecasts, which is precisely what the theory aims to predict.
Fourth, forecasts are a primary channel through which markets receive information but, to this date, some strong disagreements persist as to whether they are truly voluntary, thus offering a good setting to "test" the theory.
The starting sample is all firms present in the I/B/E/S earnings announcement (EA) database and with fiscal periods ending between January 1 st and December 31 st 2014
and non-missing identifiers, which totals 222, 149 observations and 10, 701 unique firms.
The starting period is set after Regulation Fair Disclosure, a one-time regulatory event which significantly increased the observed frequency of management forecasts for reasons outside of the model. We drop all observations with missing EA or lagged EA date, because we need to know both dates to construct the window for management forecasts and analyst consensus.
We use raw earnings per share (EPS). The raw EPS is the actual variable being forecasted by management and, further, prior research has shown that forecast tend to be relatively invariant with scale (Cheong and Thomas, 2011). As we unadjust adjusted analyst EPS forecasts to measure the market consensus, we require the adjustment factor used by I/B/E/S, which we define as the ratio between raw and adjusted EPS. For cases in which adjusted EPS is zero, we use the most recent adjustment factor or, if none exists, the latest, dropping firms for which the adjustment factor cannot be calculated. We drop all observations without an adjustment factor, which yields a preliminary sample of EAs with 217, 366 observations and 10, 337 unique firms. The data selection process is detailed further in Table 1 .
Management forecasts are obtained from the I/B/E/S company-issued guidance (CIG)
database. We retain only adjusted EPS forecasts, and use the mid-point for range fore- We remove all firms that have less than 20 earnings announcements date. This yields a full sample with 120, 445 earnings announcements, of which 21, 208 were preceded by a forecast, from a total of 3, 317 unique firms, of which 1, 464 have made at least one forecast. To estimate the model by firm, we require firms with sufficient time-series variation in forecasting behavior. We require a firm to have at least four forecasts and at least one period without a forecast. This yields a restricted sample with 42, 406 earnings announcements, of which 20, 311 were preceded by a forecast, from a total of 1, 086 unique firms. Table 2 reports some additional descriptive statistics for the full and restricted samples. Since about half of the firms in the full sample do not issue management forecasts, the frequency of disclosure is higher in the restricted sample (one in five quarters) than in the restricted sample (one in two quarters). Firms in the restricted sample tend to have lower assets ($5.6b versus $11.9b in the full sample) and slightly greater market capitalization ($6.69b versus $5.6b in the full sample). The average book-to-market is 0.58 in the restricted sample versus 0.74 in the full sample. For the other variables, averages in the full and restricted samples are similar. Another interesting fact is that we already appear to see descriptive evidence against strategic disclosure applied to the entire cross-section of firms: the average forecast surprise is very small, at 1 cent per share. So, either the entire cross-section of firms is featuring unraveling with a very low friction (which contradicts the observed frequency of disclosure) or, as we shall empirically evaluate, selective disclosure does not fit all firms in the sample. Table 3 presents multivariate descriptives on the restricted sample, with an objective to measure the type of heterogeneity present in the data and guide our empirical implementation. We only provide this analysis on the restricted sample, since this is the primary sample that is directly estimated. We use a logistic regression with dependent variable an indicator equal to one when there is a management forecast during a firmquarter (and zero otherwise) on various observable characteristics measured at the date of the earning announcement in the prior quarter. In specifications (1)- (5), most of the variables are significant but, overall, disclosure behavior appears to be primarily related to firm fixed effects. In particular, the pseudo R 2 is .311 with only firm fixed effects, versus 0.026 using other variables and 0.054 when adding industry fixed effects. Once we incorporate firm fixed effects, other variables add very little incremental R 2 , barely increasing it to 0.324. 13 This preliminary analysis suggests that additional controls add little over firm-level estimates and we therefore choose, for our baseline, to use firm-level estimates.
We also found in (6)- (7) that another factor, whether a firm has disclosed in the prior quarter, captures a large portion of heterogeneity; in fact, stickiness may be even more important than firm-level heterogeneity. One problem with stickiness is that it is endogenous to the model, as it is related to past realizations of the predicted variable. For this reason, we develop a complete theoretical treatment in later sections; note, also, that stickiness is less important (about .1 extra R 2 ) when already using firm-level estimates.
GMM Estimates
For each firm, we estimate the probability of the friction p, the variance of the manager's information σ and the bias µ using the outlined GMM procedure. We report the average and standard errors of the distribution of parameter estimates, as well as selected quantiles. The restricted sample includes only firms for which we have enough forecasts to consistently estimate the optimal weighting matrix (at least four forecasts and one period without a forecast).
In Panel A of Table 4 , the friction occurs in 40% of all quarters but, consistent with Tables 2 and 3 , there is a large amount of cross-sectional variation in the friction. The median is about 33% and half of the firms range between 7% and 72%.
14 The standarderror of the manager's private signal σ is .31, or half of the total uncertainty of .64
(the standard-error of the EPS surprise in Table 2 ). The average firm-level bias is very small, as expected given that we have netted out average bias by industry. Perhaps more surprisingly, we do not find a very large cross-sectional variation in the bias, with half of the firms lying between minus 12 cents and 4 cents of EPS.
Compared to the friction, the probability of strategic withholding is relatively flat, and remains between 15% and 25% for most firms. Panel A reports for the restricted sample: the average probability of strategic withholding is 13.21%. We conduct a J test based on the over-identifying restriction implied by the model. The test rejects at a 5% significance level the hypothesis that the firm does not behave according to DJK for 29.34% of the sample. This level of rejection, significantly greater than the expected 5% if the DJK model were to apply to all firms, implies that we can reject the joint hypothesis that DJK applies to the entire population.
In Panel B of Table 4 , we report descriptives for the subsample in which DJK is not rejected, or 708 firms out of 1,002. These firms tend to have a marginally smaller friction (35%) and manager standard-error, as well as a negative biases. The probability of withholding is very similar at 13.5%.
Next, we conduct various pooled estimates, assuming common parameters for firms over the entire sample, firms with similar past disclosures, firms with similar financial characteristics (Table 5) or firms in the same Fama French 48 industry classification (Table 6) .
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In Panel A of Table 5 , column (1) estimates a single set of parameters for the restricted sample. The estimated probability of the friction is 26.6% and the manager's variance is 0.027. The pooled variance tends to be low partly because, when imposed parameter values common to all firms, most managers are being identified by the model as being very poorly informed. The pooled model implies a higher probability of strategic withholding, at 22%. The J-test statistic implies that the DJK model is rejected at the 5% level, but not at the 1% level. In columns (2)- (4), we parse the sample as a function of past disclosure history, to capture serial correlation in disclosure behavior by separating firms that have disclosed in the previous quarter (2), did not disclose for a single quarter (3) or did not disclose for more than one quarter (4). As expected, the probability of the friction increases from column (2) to column (4). The probability of strategic withholding appears is the greatest, at 20.83%, after missing a single quarter, relative to around 10% for firms that disclosed in a previous quarter or have not disclosed for multiple periods.
In columns (5)- (8), we parse the sample in terms of financial characteristics, choosing the two ratios that appear to be the most strongly related to disclosure in Table 3 . We classify firm-quarters as to whether they are above or below the median on book-to-market and debt-to-assets, denoting H (resp. L) as an above (resp. below) median firm-quarter.
15 The pooled estimates allow us to re-examine the economic variables associated to forecasts, although they do carry a caveat. Pooled estimates ignore firm-level heterogeneity which creates misspecification in the econometric model; this causes problems in the interpretation of a joint pooled coefficient and in the conclusions from the J-test statistic given that a rejection is likely to be caused by heterogeneity in the data, rather than a fundamental breakdown in the theoretical restrictions.
We document that book-to-market and debt-to-assets appear to be positively related to the friction. One candidate explanation for this result is that high book-to-market (value) firms tend to rely less on capital markets since they expand less and highly leveraged firms rely on debt capital, which depends less on short-term fluctuations in the stock price and may involve other communication channels. Note that the model is rejected at the 5% level except for firms with low book-to-market and debt to assets.
Since we pool observations, we may now estimate the full sample, in Panel A of Table   5 , without requiring a special treatment of firms with few forecasts. Results in the full sample are very similar, and exhibit a higher probability of the friction in columns (1)-(4).
In column (4), we find that firms that have not made a forecast for at least two quarters, are very unlikely to strategically withhold information (at about 2%). Comparing to the restricted sample, we also find much more variation in the probability of strategic withholding for each characteristic in columns (5)- (8); this probability is 7% for firms with high book-to-market and debt-to-assets but increases to 18% for firms with low book-to-market and debt-to-assets. Table 6 reports additional pooled estimates by industry. In the restricted sample, the probability of strategic withholding is very stable across industries, at around 20%, and in contrast to the friction which varies from .14 to .61. We can reject the DJK model at a 5% except in the case of nine industries: Trading, Mining, Food Products, Beer and Liquor, Entertainment, Medical Equipment Candy & Soda, Real Estate and Shipbuilding. In the full sample, we find much more variation in the probability to strategically withhold, from 5% in Pharmaceutical Products to 22% in Computers. The full sample exhibits more rejections, and three additional industries, Entertainment, Food Products and Beer and Liquor, are now rejected under the J test.
Exogenous disclosure
We examine next a version of the baseline model that combines both voluntary, following DJK, and an involuntary (exogenous) disclosure. This extended model is meant to incorporate shocks that may require the manager to disclose, such as a threat of litigation or a duty to update (Jagolinzer 2009; Dye 2011) . To remain as simple as possible, we assume that, when not subject to the friction, the manager discloses with probability h > 0, a parameter that we estimate.
16 A benefit of this approach is that the variable h offers an alternative channel that explains observed disclosure behavior and thus offers a generalized approach to evaluating the DJK model -that is, from h = 0 (pure DJK) to h = 1 (disclosure is never strategic).
The moments associated to the extended model are now given as follows:
We report the firm-level estimates in Table 7 . The parameter estimates for the friction, the variance and the bias are very similar to Table 4 (which corresponds to h set to zero).
We also find that there is a very high estimated probability of exogenous disclosure, at about 56%, and about one third of the sample is estimated to be non-strategic, at h = 1, which broadly matches the rejection rates of the DJK model in Table 4 . When incorporating this additional parameter, the probability of strategic withholding is much lower, at an average of 5.7% with a disclosure friction occurring 46% of the time.
Alternative implementations
We next examine in Table 8 alternative implementations of the estimation procedure.
In Column (1), we consider a version of the model in which managers are assumed to be truthful, that is, we do not de-bias the forecasts by industry and set the firm-level bias to zero. To be coherent with this perspective, we also omit the moment condition E(g 4,t ) = 0 that was associated to the estimation of a bias. This variation is meant to be literally faithful to the assumption made in DJK that forecasts are truthful and, empirically, Table   2 also suggests that the average quarterly bias is very close to zero. 17 Nevertheless, we find that the theory is rejected much more often when assuming a zero bias, at 64.87%
versus 29.34% in the baseline, implying that the presumption of a (typically negative)
bias is critical to rationalize the model for about one third of the sample. 18 We also find a modest decrease in the probability of strategic withholding, at 12.67%.
In Columns (2) and (3), we scale total earnings by lagged total assets (calculated at the lagged quarter) and market capitalization (calculated one day before the lagged earnings announcement), keeping all other implementation choices in the baseline unchanged.
These two alternative methods of scaling are commonly-used in corporate finance and accounting but, for our purpose, tend to add significant unmodelled noise in the estimation. Indeed, we find significantly higher rejection rates, at levels equal to 51.85% for total assets and 47.84% for market capitalization. The cause of this result is that the scaling does create substantial time-series variability in the observed forecasts, but very little variability in realized biases. This causes the estimation procedure to predict very small biases for most firms which yields results similar to those in Column (1).
In Columns (4) and (5), we explore the performance of the model for unbundled forecasts only, defined as forecasts that occurs at least five days after the earnings announcement day. There are advantages and disadvantages to restricting to unbundled
forecasts. An obvious advantage is that such forecasts are isolated from the earnings announcement, which allows us to recover a forecast-specific consensus and market reaction.
In Column (4), we compute the analyst consensus during the window between the lagged earnings announcement day and the unbundled forecast day. In Column (5), we switch from the EPS surprise to the raw 3-day contemporary return (an alternative measure of investor surprise), omitting the bias and the moment corresponding to the bias. 19 Another advantage of unbundled forecasts is that they typically convey unexpected news and are unlikely to be driven by a social norm to issue forecasts. On the other hand, the fit within DJK is less evident, as unbundled forecasts can be timed during the entire period and the market does not immediately know that a forecast has been withheld. A related notable disadvantage is that, when they are not the first forecast (the most common case), it might not be appropriate to examine them in isolation of a prior bundled forecast.
In both columns, unbundled forecasts are more infrequent and consistent with a higher friction, at .72. In Column (4), the manager's private information appears similar to the bundled case and, for the market return analysis, the standard-error of the manager's posterior is 4% of market return. The probability of strategic withholding is 10.45% with raw EPS surprise and 10.58% with returns. We also find that the rejection of DJK is slightly less, at 23.45% with raw EPS and 23.79% with returns. Interestingly, these results are not only similar with each other but also roughly consistent with those obtained in the baseline setting.
19 We also performed the same analysis with market-adjusted returns, and the results are very similar.
In Column (6), we offer a preliminary exploration of annual forecasts, defined as forecasts made between six and twelve months before a fiscal year end and for the entire fiscal year. To be part of the sample, we require a firm to have at least ten annual earnings announcement. We conjecture that annual forecasts may feature a higher probability of being uninformed (in the DJK interpretation) but do not find this to be true in our sample: there is a higher frequency of earnings announcements that come with an annual forecasts, and the estimated friction is lower, at 30%. On other dimensions, we find that the probability of strategic withholding is marginally higher, at 14.32% and the probability that the model is rejected at the 5% level for one firm is similar to the baseline, at 27.25%. At a conceptual level, we did not find any deep reason as to why the theory should apply to certain voluntary forecasts and not others; speaking to this, column (6) suggest differences as to the estimated parameters but no fundamental difference as to the firm-level relevance of the theory.
4 Forecast stickiness
Serially-correlated friction
We extend the model to a multi-period setting, using index t for the time period; the resulting empirical model offers a foundation for a dependence on past disclosure as previously illustrated in columns (2)-(4) of Formally, in each period t, the following random variables realize. As before, the 20 The empirical model is faithful adaptation of Einhorn and Ziv (2008) , with one difference: they also assume that there may be a non-zero disclosure cost. We have omitted this cost because we want to focus our estimation procedure on the DJK model and conducting horse race between the DJK model and Verrecchia (1983) would take us too far from our original question.
manager's private information x t and the next-period earnings e t are jointly normal with
Within this formulation, one more restriction is needed to impose that the manager's information is his posterior expectation (as assumed in GMM). Specifically, if x t = E(e t ), it must be the case that e t = x t + u t , where u t is noise, implying that cov(e t , x t ) = ϕ This requires to set ρ 0 = ϕ 0 /σ 0 . This restriction is similar in nature to Chen and Jiang (2006) and Lundholm and Rogo (2014) who use it to test for overconfidence in analyst
forecasts. Further along, we will relax this restriction (estimating ρ 0 as a free parameter)
to observe whether management forecasts appear to feature a volatility different from that predicted by posteriors.
In addition, there is a process θ t ∈ {0, 1} where θ t = 1 indicates that the manager is subject to the DJK friction in period t. The random variable θ t follows a stationary Markov chain with transition matrix
That is, if (not) subject to the friction at date t, the manager is subject to the friction at date t + 1 with probability (k 2 ) k 1 .
We maintain the assumptions made in DJK. 22 When not subject to the friction, the manager chooses the disclosure d t ∈ argmax d E t (e t |d, dx t ) to maximize the current price 21 As before, we net out the market expectation before a forecast is made, so that x t and e t are written as forecast and market surprises.
22 In particular, we maintain the assumption that managers maximize short-term price as used in DJK, as well as EZ and other multi-period studies, such as Shin (2003) . Unfortunately, a model that involves forward-looking concerns (reputations) by the manager for future prices is neither conceptually, nor computationally, trivial. Recent work on this problem, for example, focuses on two periods (Beyer and Dye 2012; Guttman, Kremer and Skrzypacz 2014). and investors do not observe the friction but form a Bayesian expectation p t = E t (θ t ), where E t (.) represents the expectation conditional on all forecasts d i , d i x i and realized earnings e i prior to periods i < t. At one extreme, setting k 1 = 1 = 1 − k 2 yields forecasts that are completely sticky and, at the other extreme, k 1 = k 2 = p 0 yields the model estimated earlier.
Note that EZ does not pre-assume that firms pre-commit to disclose in advance or that managerial concerns for their reputation enforces disclosure behavior: the manager maximizes short-term price and stickiness emerges endogenously as a result of the timevarying market response to disclosure behavior.
23
For a given market belief p t , an analogue to equation (19) holds
implying that the disclosure threshold y 0,t is time-varying and, is intuitive, varies with market beliefs p t .
EZ further show that p t is updated each period as
where
To explain the updates (20) and (21), note that if the manager discloses in period t, then the market knows that the manager was not subject to the friction, that is, θ t = 0.
23 In their survey of upper management, Graham, Harvey and Rajgopal (2005) note that the act of disclosing information sets a precedent before investors whereby investors tend to expect more disclosure from a firm that has frequently disclosed in the past versus one that has remained silent. EZ is entirely consistent with this explanation because a disclosure changes market beliefs about the friction.
24 See Appendix equation (A3), p. 584, in Einhorn and Ziv (2008) . From the transition matrix (18), the probability of being subject to the friction must be k 2 in period t + 1. If the manager does not disclose in period t, then the market knows that either the manager was subject to the friction, which conditional on realized earnings e t and non-disclosure, has probability α(p t ) or was not subject to the friction, which has probability 1 − α(p t ).
Before we lay out the estimation procedure, let us briefly illustrate how EZ can explain any level of serial correlation in forecasts. Assume that k 1 > k 2 , which means that the friction is persistent. For exposition purposes, let us (for now) assume that we do not condition on earnings so that α t = pt pt+(1−pt)Φ(Z(pt)) . Let us denote p k as the market prior after exactly k periods of non-disclosure, then, it is readily seen that
is strictly increasing, so that the market becomes more convinced that the manager is uninformed after repeated periods of non-disclosure. This is illustrated in the left-hand side of Figure, with σ 0 = 1, k 1 = .7 and k 2 = .2: in the first period after a disclosure, the market believes that the manager is subject to the friction with probability p 0 = k 2 = .2 after one period, the new market beliefs is p 1 = .44 as the manager is more likely to have been subject to the friction in both periods and, after two periods of non-disclosure p 2 = 0.56. This reduces the probability of disclosure from 59% in a period following a disclosure to 27% after only two periods of non-disclosure.
In the general model with observed earnings, realized earnings also play an important role in the updating function (21). Specifically, as illustrated on the left panel of Figure   1 (with ϕ 0 = .7, p t = k 2 and ρ 0 = .6), high realized earnings make it more likely that the manager did not disclose because of the friction. Hence, high earnings imply that, in future periods, the firm is perceived as a high friction firms and becomes less likely to disclose. In this example, for an increase from a half standard-deviation below mean to a half standard-deviation above mean, the probability of disclosure decreases from 36% to 29%.
Maximum Likelihood Estimation
The multi-period updating belief of market beliefs makes it convenient to use a different econometric approach to conduct the estimation. Maximum likelihood estimation (MLE)
is a method in which we use the likelihood function of a sequence observations and it allows us to input directly the theoretical market beliefs into the likelihood of each observation, in order to write the likelihood of a time-series of observations. The primary benefit of MLE is that it implicitly selects moments (the first-order condition on the likelihood function) that minimize the asymptotic variance of the estimators and it can be simpler to implement than GMM if the theoretical moments are not in closed-form (as in EZ).
On the other hand, MLE is sensitive to misspecification and, for this reason, we conduct it only at the firm-level.
To illustrate the method, let us consider first a simplified version, imposing p 0 = k 1 = k 2 to replicate the pure DJK model estimated earlier with GMM. Recall that, for a given firm, there is a sample {d t , d t x t , e t } where d t is a binary variable equal to one if there is a forecast at date t, d t x t is the forecast, and e t is the following realized earnings. In the pure DJK model, the likelihood of the sample is
where g is the marginal probability density of e t , H(.|e t ) is the cumulative distribution of x t conditional on realized earnings e t . and ζ t is a binary variable equal to one if
In the likelihood function L, for each observation (d t , d t x t , e t ), the first term in brackets g(e t )(p + (1 − p)H t (Z(p)|e t )) captures the likelihood of observing realized earnings e t and non-disclosure. The second term in brackets (1 − p)f (x t , e t ) captures the likelihood of realized earnings e t and disclosure x t . In addition, as captured by the binary variable ζ t , the likelihood of observing an observation below the theoretical threshold σZ(p), which imposes the bound
This bound is key for understanding how MLE reconciles with DJK observations in which very bad news are voluntarily disclosed, that is, when min(x) is a large negative number. A forecast d t x t must always be above the disclosure threshold σZ(p). So, to meet this bound, the estimation relies on all three parameters (p, σ, µ). First, a lower probability of the friction p tends to shift the model toward unraveling (full disclosure), increasing disclosure by reducing Z(p). Second, a higher σ implies that the manager has more precise information and the market reacts more strongly to a non-disclosure; in turn, this will also decrease the disclosure threshold. Third, a decrease in the bias µ reduces the predicted disclosure threshold. While they can explain low disclosures, these three parameters also penalize the likelihood function: a low p requires frequent disclosures, a high σ requires volatile forecasts and a low µ requires low signed forecast errors.
The likelihood function in equation (24) is easily adapted to k 1 = k 2 by replacing p with p t (k 1 , k 2 ) given by the updating equations (20). To implement the estimation with a finite sample, we further set p 0 =
which is the steady-state probability of not being informed in the Markov chain.
To interpret the estimated parameters, we examine two moments of special interest.
First, we compute the steady-state probability of being subject to the friction, which we denote by p ∞ . That is,
This probability measures the importance of the friction and lies in-between k 1 and k 2 .
This parameter reveals how often the manager does not disclosure for reasons unrelated to his information about the firm's future earnings. Second, we define v ∞ as the steadystate probability that the manager withholds information for strategic reasons, namely, when the information is unfavorable. We compute it by simulating histories of 1000 periods given the MLE estimate, and recovering the probability as the average frequency of strategic withholding realized in the simulated histories.
Lastly, as for the case of GMM, we also estimate an extension of this model, assuming that with probability h, the manager discloses for exogenous reasons when not subject to the friction. This modification is even more important in the MLE model that it was in the GMM model, because it can now explain why some firms may make disclosures below the threshold. The likelihood function is altered to
MLE estimates
In Table 9 , we present the results of maximum likelihood estimation. Panel A presents the results with the baseline model without exogenous disclosure. We find high levels of persistence in the friction, that is, the probability of remaining subject to the friction is, on average, 67%, versus 16% after a period without the friction (e.g., a quarter following a forecast). The standard-deviation of the managers' private information, at .43, implying that the manager knows in advance about 61% of the standard-deviation of the realized earnings innovation (at 0.70). Overall, the friction occurs about one quarter out of three.
The implied probability of strategic disclosure is somewhat lower than in the comparable GMM model, at 9.94%, because the serial correlation in the friction allows the market to learn about the manager's type and (comparatively) reduces the ability of an informed manager to strategically withhold.
In Panel B of the same Table, we estimate the MLE model including an exogenous probability of disclosure h. The estimates for the process of the friction (k 1 , k 2 ) are similar to Panel A. On the other hand, we find that including an estimate h affects the estimates of other parameters. First, in this generalized model, we find a slightly lower standarderror on the manager's information and on realized earnings, because this model relies less on noise to fit the predicted restrictions. The probability of the friction is now higher, at 42.86%. We also estimate that more than half of the sample does not appear to be making any voluntary disclosure (ĥ = 1). The average probability of mandatory disclosure is very high, at 76%, which makes the estimated probability of strategic withholding is only about 2.6%.
We also conduct a likelihood ratio test, taking as our null hypothesis that h = 0 or, "there is no mandatory disclosure." Under the null, the difference between two times the log-likelihood in Panel B and the log-likelihood in Panel A follows a χ 2 distribution with one degree of freedom. We can reject this null hypothesis for about 2/3 of the sample (65.7%) at the 5% level. As expected, rejection rates are significantly greater than under GMM because our implementation of MLE requires disclosure theory to explain the data more closely (i.e., does not impose only the economic moments). Also, note that the null of the test is different from the J test: we are testing here whether the fit is improved whether the addition of some exogenous disclosure improves the statistical model.
In Table 10 , we re-estimate the model without the restriction to Bayesian posterior expectations, that is, estimating ρ 0 in (17) as a free parameter. This extended model has various possible interpretations. For example, it may be that the manager simply reports a private signal, letting the market form a posterior expectation or that the manager puts too much weight on his private signal, thus leading to excess volatility in forecasts (which we interpret as overconfidence). For expositional purposes, and as in Chen and
Jiang (2006), we refer to this model as "overconfidence."
In Panel A, we report the estimates of the model with h = 0. We find a higher level of persistence than in Table 9 , and the model predicts that the standard-error in the manager's forecast is very close to that in realized earnings (albeit lower). This increase in the standard-error of forecasts, relative to Table 9 , does suggest that there is some amount of excess volatility in forecasts relative to the Bayesian model. The average estimated correlation ρ is at 57%, which is lower than a baseline ratio of ρ * = 0.53/0.61 = 86% if all firms were identical to the average firm and did not experience overconfidence. 25 Hence, this suggests that forecasts and realized earnings correlate far less than expected by Bayesian posteriors. About 29.44% of firms feature a variance in forecasts that is greater than the variance in realized earnings, which is anomalous outside of the overconfident model. As a more formal test, we conduct a likelihood ratio test using the null hypothesis "ρ = σ/ϕ" at the 5% level by comparing the log likelihood in Table 9 Panel A to the log likelihood in Table 10 Panel A. This hypothesis is rejected for most of the sample (81.14%).
In Panel B, we re-estimate model when including h as a free parameter. Interestingly, one important effect of including the estimation of h is to reduce the estimated overconfidence. The standard-error of the manager's information is much lower than in Panel A, with an averageσ at 0.36. The estimated correlation remains very similar (slightly higher), atρ = 0.66 on average. In the model with overconfidence, the estimated probability of mandatory disclosure is lower, although still very high, at 63%. Estimates of the probability of the friction and of the probability of strategic disclosure are very similar to the model in Table 9 , implying that including overconfidence in the statistical model is primarily important to estimate the manager's information precision when not subject to the friction, not the process for the friction.
We compute the two likelihood ratio tests conducted earlier. In the model with estimated h, we can only reject "ρ = σ/ϕ" at the 5% level for one third of the firms (33.93%), much lower than the estimated 81.14% in Table 9 . We also conduct the likelihood ratio test of "h = 0" and find a very similar frequency of rejections, at about 2/3 of the sample (64.89%).
Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a simple empirical methodology to structurally estimate and tests models of voluntary disclosure with uncertain frictions, as in Dye (1985) and Jung and Kwon (1988) . The estimation procedure can incorporate various important features, such as disclosure biases, involuntary disclosure and (endogenous) stickiness in observed disclosure patters. The structural parameters recover the inputs of the decision problem faced by a manager when choosing whether or not to disclose, and offer researchers to test the internal validity of the theory. To our knowledge, our study is the first to offer an estimation procedure that is fully derived from theoretical predictions.
Applying the model to quarterly management forecast data, we find that strategic withholding is uncommon. Depending on samples and specification, we find the unconditional incidence of strategic withholding is often not more than 13%, but as low 2.6% in our most general statistical model.
The structural approach also offers stricter tests of the theory, and we find that from 1/3 to 2/3 of the firms do not appear to disclose in a manner consistently with disclosures being purely voluntary. We interpret these observations more broadly, as limited evidence suggesting that strategic short-term price manipulations are unlikely to be a first-order consideration. Because forecast withholding is likely less risky than other forms of quarterly accrual manipulations, this result may, more generally, indicate that managers do not care about short-term prices as much as usually assumed.
Yet, as an important caveat to interpreting our results, we do not claim to have found evidence against the theory in any setting, nor do we claim to have tested any possible version of disclosure theory. In this respect, our objective is mainly to test for potential limitations of a theory in order to both improve it and identify other settings where it may apply. Indeed, several research directions may offer promising paths for extended theories. First, recent laboratory evidence suggests that subjects might not disclose according to the predictions of disclosure theory (Jin, Luca and Martin 2015) , suggesting modifications of the equilibrium concept. Second, it is an open question as to whether long-term information may not be managed; in particular, one may possibly find greater levels of manipulation in such long-term forecasts. Other types of disclosures, such as contract disclosures and other press releases or MD&A, may offer valuable other settings where the theory may apply. The method developed here is applicable as long as there is an option to withhold and there is data about either a market reaction or a quantitative disclosure. Third, we have estimated the standard models of disclosure of Dye (1985) and Jung and Kwon (1988) , as well as Einhorn and Ziv (2008) , as they have been proposed and used in the literature. These models offer the natural first step to take theory to data, and we needed to first evaluate their ability to explain empirical facts. However, their failure may be tied to their simplicity and further insights may be obtained by extending these models to incorporate features such as costs, real decisions, litigation deterrence, long-term managerial objectives, managerial learning or earnings manipulation, among other possibilities. (1) pools all firm-quarters in the sample. Models (2)-(4) pool firm-quarters that were preceded by a forecast (1), a single period without a forecast (3) and two or more quarters without a forecast (4). Models (5)- (8) pool firmquarters with above-median book-to-market and debt to assets (5), above-median book-to-market and below-median debt to assets (6), below-median book-to-market and above-median debt to assets (7) and below-median book-to-market and debt to assets (8).
Panel A: Restricted sample This table reports the results from the GMM estimation on samples, pooled by industry using the Fama-French 48 industry classification. The full sample includes firms covered by I/B/E/S with 20 or more earnings announcements. The restricted samples of firms covered by I/B/E/S with 20 or more earnings announcements, at least one quarter without a forecast and at least four forecasts. Standard-errors (SE) were computed using the optimal weighting matrix (Hansen 1982) . Four industries, defense, fabricated products, precious metals and tobacco products had too few forecasts to be estimated. Hide indicates the probability that information is voluntarily withheld. This table reports the results from the GMM estimation with other data preparation and estimation assumptions. In Column (1), the model is estimated assuming that no signal is biased, omitting the industry-level debias and the bias moment. In Columns (2) and (3), EPS are standardized by lagged total assets and market capitalization one day before the forecast, respectively. In Column (4), the model is estimated using unbundled forecasts only and using the analyst consensus obtained by analyst forecasts during the window after the prior earnings announcement and the management forecast date.
Restricted
In Column (5), we use 3-day market returns centered around the unbundled forecast date as a measure of surprise. In Column (6), we use forecasts made for an entire year, and at least six months before fiscal year end. Firms with singular variance-covariance matrix were classified as J test rejections.
(1) This table reports the results from the MLE estimation, run separately for each firm. We uses the restricted samples of firms covered by I/B/E/S with 20 or more EAs, at least one quarter without a MF and at least four MFs. Panel A reports the estimates using the basic model. Panel B reports the estimates using the extended model in which an exogenous probability of mandatory disclosure is estimated conditional on not being subject to the friction. This table reports the results from the MLE estimation, run separately for each firm and estimating the covariance between the manager's information and realized earnings. We uses the restricted samples of firms covered by I/B/E/S with 20 or more EAs, at least one quarter without a MF and at least four MFs. Panel A reports the estimates using the basic model. Panel B reports the estimates using the extended model in which an exogenous probability of mandatory disclosure is estimated conditional on not being subject to the friction. 
